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THE FAIR MARKET VALUE METHOD
OF PROPERTY VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN:
"JUST COMPENSATION" OR JUST BARELY COMPENSATING?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London,' the United States
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the taking of individuals' homes in
furtherance of an economic redevelopment plan.2 The Court chose not to
establish a bright-line rule classifying an eminent domain transfer of one
citizen's property to another as a private use,3 which has led to a common
conception that all private property is in jeopardy.4 Kelo led state legislatures
across the nation to propose legislation and constitutional amendments designed
specifically to protect their citizens from a result similar to that in Kelo.5
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Id. at 484.
3. Id. at 486-87.
4. See id.
5. See Leonard Gilroy, Eminent Domain: Voters Protect Property Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
18, 2006, at A29, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/16043022.htm
("35 states have now passed laws to curb eminent domain abuse since the [Kelo] ruling."). Between
January 1, 2006 and November 7, 2006, at least twenty-three state legislatures have proposed or enacted
legislation, constitutional amendments, or both regarding eminent domain in which the legislative
findings or legislative history explicitly mentioned Kelo. See H.B. 318, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
2006), 2005 AK H.B. 318 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 1206, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), 2005 CA S.B.
1206 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. J. Res. 44, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), 2005 CA A.J.R. 44 (NS)
(Westlaw); S. Const. Amend. 20, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), 2005 CA S.C.A. 20 (NS)
(Westlaw); H.B. 1099, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006), 2006 CO H.B. 1099 (NS)
(Westlaw); S.B. 665, 2006 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006), 2006 CT S.B. 665 (NS) (Westlaw);
H.B. 5810, 2006 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006), 2006 CT H.B. 5810 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 34,
2006 Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006), 2006 CT S.B. 34 (NS) (Westlaw); H. Mem'l 1601, 2006
Leg.,108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006), 2006 FL H.M. 1601 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 391, 148th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), 2005 GA S.B. 391 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 960, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2006), 2005 GA H.B. 960 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2986, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI
S.B. 2986 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 3191, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI S.B. 3191 (NS)
(Westlaw); H.B. 2135, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI H.B. 2135 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B.
2766, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI H.B. 2766 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2939, 23d Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI S.B. 2939 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2458, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006),
2005 HI H.B. 2458 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2233, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI H.B. 2233
(NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 3215, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006), 2005 HI H.B. 3215 (NS) (Westlaw);
S.B. 1429, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1429 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 1254, 58th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1254 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 1242, 58th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1242 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 1244, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1244 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 1245, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID
S.B. 1245 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 1248, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1248 (SN)
(Westlaw); S.B. 1249, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1249 (SN) (Westlaw); H.B.
2543, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006), 2005 KS H.B. 2543 (NS) (Westlaw); H. Paper 1310, 122d
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From coast to coast, state legislatures have proposed legislation in reaction to
Kelo covering a variety of topics including revisions to condemnation
procedures under current eminent domain statutes,6 codified lists of what
constitutes a valid "public use" for the purposes of eminent domain,7 and even
the placement of temporary moratoriums on the exercise of eminent domain for
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2006), 2005 ME H.P. 1310 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 1410,421st Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006), 2006 MD H.B. 1410 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 173,421st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2006), 2006 MD S.B. 173 (NS) (Westlaw); S. Con. Res. 568,2006 Leg., 121 st Sess. (Miss. 2006),
2006 MS S.C.R. 568 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006), 2006
MO H.B. 1944 (NS) (Westlaw); Legis. Res. 252, 99th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2006), 2005 NE L.R.
252 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. B. 3446,212th Leg., 1 st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ A.B. 3446 (NS)
(Westlaw); S.B. 2088, 212th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ S.B. 2088 (NS) (Westlaw);
Assem. B. 3257, 212th Leg., I st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ A.B. 3257 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 1975,
212th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ S.B. 1975 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. B. 3178, 212th
Leg., 1 st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ A.B. 3178 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. B. 2423, 212th Leg., 1st
Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ A.B. 2423 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. Con. Res. 138, 212th Leg., 1st
Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006 NJ A.C.R. 138 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 211,212th Leg., 1 st Ann. Sess. (N.J.
2006), 2006 NJ S.B. 211 (NS) (Westlaw); S. Con. Res. 40,212th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2006
NJ S.C.R. 40 (NS) (Westlaw); Assem. B. 4552, 212th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2006), 2004 NJ A.B.
4552 (NS) (Westlaw); H.J. Mem'l 52, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2006), 2006 NM H.J.M. 52 (NS)
(Westlaw); H. Mem'l 6,47th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2006), 2006 NM H.M. 6 (NS) (Westlaw); S. Mem'l
3,47th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2006), 2006 NM S.M. 3 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 1321, 2005 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006), 2005 NC S.B. 1321 (NS) (Westlaw); H.R. 1855,2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2006), 2005 NC H.R. 1855 (NS) (Westlaw); S. Con. Res. 59, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2006), 2005 OK S.C.R. 59 (NS) (Westlaw); H.R. 597, 189th Gen. Assem., 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2006), 2005 PA H.R. 597 (SN) (Westlaw); S.B. 2155, 2006 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006), 2005
RI S.B. 2155 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2785, 2006 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006), 2005 RI S.B. 2785
(NS) (Westlaw); H. Con. R. 4826, 116th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2006), 2005 SC H.C.R. 4826
(NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 4310, 116th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2006), 2005 SC H.B. 4310 (NS)
(Westlaw); S.B. 982, 116th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2006), 2005 SC S.B. 982 (NS) (Westlaw);
S.J. Res. 996,104th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN S.J.R. 996 (NS) (Westlaw); S.J.
Res. 999, 104th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN S.J.R. 999 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B.
3775, 104th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN H.B. 3775 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2483,
104th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN H.B. 2483 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2428, 104th
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN H.B. 2428 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2413, 104th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN S.B. 2413 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2420, 104th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN S.B. 2420 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 2424, 104th Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2006), 2005 TN S.B. 2424 (NS) (Westlaw); S. Res. 8738, 59th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA S.R. 8738 (SN) (Westlaw); H.B. 3017, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2006), 2005 WA H.B. 3017 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 6701, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA
S.B. 6701 (NS) (Westlaw); S.J. Mem'1 8036,59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA S.J.M. 8036
(NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 6807, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA S.B. 6807 (NS) (Westlaw);
S.B. 6808, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA S.B. 6808 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2854, 59th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA H.B. 2854 (NS) (Westlaw); H.B. 2626, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2006), 2005 WA H.B. 2626 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 6345, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006),
2005 WA S.B. 6345 (NS) (Westlaw); S.B. 6388, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006), 2005 WA S.B.
6388 (NS) (Westlaw).
6. See, e.g., S.B. 1249, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1249 (SN) (Westlaw)
(requiring "the condemning authority to disclose its assessment of just compensation to the property
owner" prior to the condemnation proceeding).
7. See, e.g., H.B. 318, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006), 2005 AK H.B. 318 (NS) (Westlaw)
(setting forth thirteen specific categories of valid public uses).
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particular purposes.8 This legislation addresses much of the widespread concern
regarding the issue of public use in eminent domain; however, it does not yet
sufficiently address, and in many cases ignores, the important issue of just
compensation.
Although several states have addressed just compensation in eminent
domain,9 none has enacted legislation that would take into account the subjective
value of an individual's home. Subjective value in the home results from the
personal dignity and social status that accompany homeownership, as well as the
sentimental value an individual places on the home and surrounding land.
Property owners develop a special attachment to the land they own and improve,
especially when the land has been in the family for generations. This Comment
proposes that if the state of South Carolina exercises its power of eminent
domain, particularly when a home is taken away from an individual for slum
clearance or urban renewal, courts should consider factors in addition to the fair
market value of the property, such as the subjective value of the property, when
determining what constitutes just compensation.
Part II of this Comment briefly discusses the origins and development of
eminent domain in the United States and South Carolina. Part II also examines
the judicial developments regarding the interpretations of just compensation in
the United States and South Carolina. Part III analyzes the fair market value
calculation of just compensation and its failure to adequately compensate
landowners and suggests methods that South Carolina could employ to remedy
this problem. Part IV concludes.
II. BACKGROUND ON EMINENT DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION
A. Origins of Eminent Domain Power
1. The Federal System
The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."'" The Supreme Court has noted that
eminent domain is an "incident of sovereignty" and the Fifth Amendment
simply acts as a limitation upon the exercise of that power." The Takings Clause
8. See, e.g., H.B. 960, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006), 2005 GA H.B. 960 (NS)
(Westlaw) (proposing the placement of a temporary moratorium on exercise of eminent domain for the
purpose of urban development).
9. See, e.g., S.B. 1429, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1429 (SN) (Westlaw)
(preventing a condemning authority from paying less compensation than its final pre-litigation offer);
H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006), 2006 MO H.B. 1944 (NS) (Westlaw) (requiring
the payment of additional compensation under certain circumstances).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
2007]
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of the Fifth Amendment is "a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take




Scholars have discovered evidence of eminent domain dating back to
Biblical times.13 Under the common law, the English government possessed the
power to obtain private land for its own use. 14 Upon winning independence from
England, each original American state was vested with powers similar to those
held by the English government, including the power of eminent domain.'5
After states began drafting and ratifying their own constitutions, variations
in constitutional language regarding eminent domain resulted in variations of
judicial interpretation. 6 One aspect of the Takings Clause that American courts
have never truly agreed upon is what constitutes a public use for the purposes of
eminent domain.'7
The United States Supreme Court discussed the use of eminent domain for
the purpose of slum clearance in the landmark decision Berman v. Parker.8 In
Berman, the Court upheld the right of a congressionally-created entity to
condemn a dilapidated area of Washington, D.C., for the sole purpose of
redevelopment, notwithstanding that part of the development plan involved the
introduction of new private enterprises to the area, and that several buildings
within that area were not dilapidated. 1' Affected landowners contended that the
taking transferred property "from one businessman for the benefit of another
businessman. 20 In response to this argument, the Court noted that "[t]he public
end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than
through a department of govermment-or so the Congress might conclude. We
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public
purposes of community redevelopment projects."'" Thus, the Court's holding
validated the notion that a transfer of property from one private entity to another
could still be considered a public use under the Fifth Amendment, so long as the
transfer would serve a public purpose.
Confronted with a similar question in Kelo v. City of New London,22 the
Supreme Court again upheld a transfer of privately owned property from one
12. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) (citing United States v. Cooper, 20
D.C. (9 Mackey) 104, 116 (D.C. 1891), affd sub nom. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282
(1893); In re Rugheimer, 36 F. 369, 371 (E.D.S.C. 1888)).
13. 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §1.2[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2006).
14. Id. § 1.21.
15. Id. § 1.23[1].
16. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argumentfor
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 504-06 (2006).
17. Mark C. Landry, Note, The Public Use Requirement in EminentDomain-A Requiem, 60 TUL.
L. REv. 419, 423-24 (1985) (discussing the split among states using the "use by public" test and the
more elastic "public advantage" test).
18. 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
19. Id. at 33-36.
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id. at 33-34.
22. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
[Vol. 58: 489
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private entity to another private entity by eminent domain and determined
economic development to be a valid public use. 23 The petitioners argued that the
failure to create a bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a public use in the
context of economic development will enable a city to transfer "citizen A's
property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a
more productive use and thus pay more taxes. '24 The majority of the Court
stated that such a situation "would certainly raise a suspicion that a private
purpose was afoot, '2 5 but chose not to create a bright-line rule.26 In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's acceptance of a broad definition for
public use was unwise, and that such a definition would place all private
property rights in jeopardy. 7 Similarly, Justice Thomas argued for a literal
interpretation of public use, stating "that the government may take property only
if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property. 28
Based on the decisions of the Supreme Court, a transfer by the government
of property from private entity A to private entity B is constitutional as long as
the condemning authority sets forth a valid public purpose. One of the public
purposes that the Court has repeatedly found valid is economic development,
which clearly applies to the situation of slum clearance or urban renewal.
2. The South Carolina System
As discussed previously, the American colonies essentially adopted the
power of eminent domain from England.29 Prior to the adoption of the South
Carolina constitution in 1868, the South Carolina government carried out its
power of eminent domain with no requirement or practice of compensating
persons from whom it took private lands.3" Since 1868, the South Carolina
constitution has controlled the exercise of eminent domain with a provision
similar to that found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.3'
Article I, section 13 of the South Carolina constitution states that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken for
private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just
compensation being first made therefor. ' 3 2 Although the language of this
23. Id. at 488-89.
24. Id. at 486-87.
25. Id. at 487.
26. Id. at 486-87.
27. See id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29. SACKMAN ETAL., supra note 13, § 1.23[1].
30. See S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Miller, 237 S.C. 386, 390, 117 S.E.2d 561, 562-63 (1960)
("It was decided in this state, as early as 1796, that, in the absence of a constitutional requirement that
compensation should be made, the Legislature has the power, in the exercise of the state's right of
eminent domain, to take private lands for public highways without compensation." (quoting Wilson v.
Greenville County, 110 S.C. 321,326-27, 96 S.E. 301, 303 (1918))).
31. Id. at 390-91, 117 S.E.2d at 563.
32. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
2007]
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provision is very similar to the language of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, important distinctions exist.
The South Carolina provision, unlike the Fifth Amendment, contains
language requiring the consent of a landowner in the event that the government
takes land for private use. On its face, this requirement appears to be a dead
letter as a result of Kelo, in which the Court interpreted a taking of property that
was seemingly for private use as public use simply because the public would
benefit. However, South Carolina courts have interpreted article I, section 13 in
a much stricter manner than the way the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fifth Amendment:
33
Some cases take the very broad view that 'public use' is
synonymous with 'public benefit.' A more restricted view,
however, would seem to better comport with the due protection
of private property against spoliation under the guise of
eminent domain .... '[P]ublic use' means the same as 'use by
the public.'
34
The South Carolina Supreme Court also stated that "[l]ands cannot be
condemned for other than a public use of the same. '35 The court further noted
that "[i]n still other states the power of eminent domain may be exercised for a
public purpose, benefit or the public welfare, as contrasted with the requirement
of our constitution that it be for a public use. 36
The South Carolina Supreme Court took the public use requirement one step
further in Karesh v. City Council of Charleston.3 7 Karesh involved the proposed
condemnation of one city block in downtown Charleston, with the city to lease
the condemned land to a private corporation for the construction of a parking
garage and convention center.38 Although the city imposed a requirement on the
private corporation that a minimum of 90% of the parking garage must be
available to the general public, the South Carolina Supreme Court disallowed
the condemnation on the grounds that it was not a valid public use.39
Continuing its narrow interpretation of the public use requirement in
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Jasper County,4" the South Carolina
Supreme Court explicitly stated that South Carolina courts "take a restrictive
view of the power of eminent domain because it is in derogation of the right to
33. See Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 432-33, 126 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1962).
34. Id. at 432, 126 S.E.2d at 363 (quoting Riley v. Charleston Union Station Co., 71 S.C. 457,
485-86, 51 S.E. 485, 496 (1905)).
35. Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 391, 175 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1970).
36. Id. at 392, 175 S.E.2d at 812 (quoting Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 570, 91
S.E.2d 280, 282 (1956)).
37. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
38. Id. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 343-44.
39. Id. at 344-45, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
40. 355 S.C. 631, 586 S.E.2d 853 (2003).
[Vol. 58: 489
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acquire, possess, and defend property. It is well-settled that the power of
eminent domain cannot be used to accomplish a project simply because it will
benefit the public."'4 1 Each of these cases demonstrates the unwillingness of
South Carolina courts to accept a broad definition of public use in the context of
eminent domain, unlike the United States Supreme Court in such cases as
Berman and Kelo.
3. Modification of South Carolina's Eminent Domain Power-The
Inclusion of Urban Renewal as a Public Use
As a result of the narrow definition of public use that South Carolina courts
have historically employed regarding eminent domain, South Carolina
governmental entities could not constitutionally condemn privately owned land
and transfer that land to another private party, even if such transfer would
benefit public welfare. To allow such transfers to take place in the context of
urban renewal, the South Carolina legislature had to amend the state
constitution. Article XIV, section 5 of the South Carolina constitution, which
resulted from amendments that took place between 1967 and 1971, now
authorizes the General Assembly to create laws allowing for local municipalities
or any housing or redevelopment authority of specified counties to "undertake
and carry out slum clearance and redevelopment work in areas which are
predominantly slum or blighted, the preparation of such areas for reuse, and the
sale or other disposition of such areas to private enterprise for private uses or to
public bodies for public uses. 42
This amendment to the South Carolina constitution makes the language
found in article I, section 13 a dead letter with regard to situations in which the
government has declared the property to be taken as slum or blighted. Although
the taking entity must still provide just compensation to the landowner whose
property is taken, no constitutional provision requires that the landowner must
consent prior to the government taking his land for private use.43 Article XIV,
section 5 provides the government with constitutional authority to carry out
takings like those in Berman by focusing on the area as a whole instead of
individual structures.44
41. Id. at 638, 586 S.E.2d at 856 (citations omitted).
42. S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5. For a similar provision affecting other counties, see also S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 17. "Any [slum clearance] shall constitute a governmental function undertaken for
public purposes, and the powers of taxation and eminent domain may be exercised and public funds
expended in furtherance thereof." Id.
43. See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
44. See id.; supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
2007]
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B. The Requirement of Just Compensation
1. The Federal System
The United States Supreme Court has noted on multiple occasions that the
requirement for just compensation found in the Fifth Amendment serves the
purpose of preventing the government from forcing a small group of citizens to
incur a cost that, in fairness, should be absorbed by society.45 The Supreme
Court has also stated that "[t]he constitutional requirement of just compensation
derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness ... as it[]
does from technical concepts of property law."46 In determining the value of just
compensation in any taking, courts must evaluate what the landowner would
consider just, as well as what society, which is responsible for making the
payment, would consider just.47
The United States Supreme Court has used the concept of "fair market
value" to determine the amount of money the condemnor must pay the
condemnee.4 8 One method by which a court may determine the fair market value
of a given piece of property is for the court to ascertain
"the highest price estimated in terms of money that the land
will bring if exposed for sale in the open market with a
reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser buying with
knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which it is adapted
and for which it is capable of b[e]ing used; the amount which
land would bring if it were offered for sale by one who desired,
but was not obliged, to sell, and was bought by one who was
willing, but not obliged to buy."49
For the majority of courts, the preferred method in performing the above-
mentioned determination is a comparable sales analysis." Under such analysis,
appraisers look at data concerning the sales of similar properties and then adjust
the valuation of the target property based on differences between the properties
being compared. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that comparable sales
need not be identical sales "because each parcel of real property differs from
45. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
46. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citing United States v. Commodities
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950)).
47. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 123 (1950).
48. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
49. Detroit/Wayne County Stadium Auth. v. Drinkwater, Taylor & Merrill, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 549,
557 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Consumers Power Co. v. Allegan State Bank, 174 N.W.2d 578,591
(Mich. Ct. App. 1970)).
50. See, e.g., United States v. 819.98 Acres of Land, 78 F.3d 1468, 1471 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
51. City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2001).
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every other parcel," but there must be some similarity between the parcels in
question. 2 This fair market value analysis eliminates any consideration of the
subjective nature of worth that an individual attaches to property at a given time.
Calabresi and Melamed, exploring other valuation tools, used economic
analysis in investigating the difference between property rules and liability rules
of entitlement.5 3 A property rule protects an entitlement "to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from
him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller."54 Under a liability rule, "an external, objective standard of
value is used to facilitate the transfer of the entitlement from the holder to the
[party desiring the entitlement]."55 Focusing primarily on the issue of nuisance,
Calabresi and Melamed assert that when transaction costs are low, courts should
employ a property rule in determining compensation.56 Conversely, when
transaction costs are high, courts should ascertain compensation based on a
liability rule.57 These assertions are based on notions of economic efficiency and
distributive goals.58
Applying the work of Calabresi and Melamed to the field of eminent
domain, it is clear that American courts currently use a liability rule in
determining just compensation for a piece of property taken by the government
or a governmental entity. Calabresi and Melamed discuss the benefits of using a
liability rule in the context of eminent domain, but they focus on a taking from a
large group of individuals (one thousand) for a bona fide public use (the
construction of a park). 59 While the application of a liability rule in this context
seems logical considering the excessive amount of transaction costs, the same is
not necessarily so for the taking of an individual's home, or even a small group
of individuals' homes.
2. The South Carolina System
South Carolina law requires that a condemning authority compensate a
property owner for the value of the property taken, as well as any additional
damage to the landowner's remaining property in the event that the government
condemns only a portion of her property.60 If the public project performed on the
condemned land results in an increase in the value of the remaining land of the
52. United States v. 103.38 Acres of Land, 660 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Fairfield
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 306 F.2d 167, 172-73 (9th Cir.1962)).
53. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092, 1106-10 (1972).
54. Id. at 1092.
55. Id. at 1106.
56. Seeid. at 1106-10.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 1110.
59. Id. at 1106-07.
60. Gray v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 311 S.C. 144, 150,427 S.E.2d 899,902 (Ct.
App. 1992) (citing S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Bolt, 242 S.C. 411,417, 131 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1963)).
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condemnee, the determination of just compensation should reflect an offset
equal to the amount of that increase. 6' The requirement for just compensation is
codified in the South Carolina Code of Laws, which provides that a landowner
shall be compensated for the value of the property taken and any damage to his
remaining land, taking into account any benefits to the landowner.62
Following the federal approach, the South Carolina scheme bases the
determination of just compensation on the fair market value of the property.63
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that "[flair market value is the price
which a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, neither being under compulsion
to buy or sell and both being fully informed of all uses to which the-property is
adopted and for which it is capable of being used. 64 South Carolina also allows
for the appraiser to determine just compensation on the basis of the highest and
best use of the property, regardless of whether the property owner has, or had,
plans for that use.65 Once the condemnor takes the property, the condemnee is
entitled to the market value based on what the appraiser determines to be the
highest and best use of the property at that time, not merely the market value
based on the condition of the property at that time.66
In summary, both federal and South Carolina courts require that a
condemning authority provide just compensation for all property taken.
Furthermore, the federal and South Carolina systems both use the fair market
value method of calculating the appropriate amount for just compensation.
Although the definition of public use may differ between the federal and South
Carolina systems, two things remain clear: A landowner whose property the
government deems to be slum or blighted is at risk of the government
condemning that property under the constitutionally accepted public use of
urban renewal, and compensation the market deems "fair" is all the landowner
will receive in return.
3. Current Status of Intangible Values in the Calculation of Just
Compensation
The fair market value approach raises questions about faimess because it
does not reflect the subjective values that individuals attach to property, such as
the values that arise from ownership, personal improvement, and family
connection. The failure to include such values results in compensation that is
anything but just.
61. Smith v. City of Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 259-60, 92 S.E.2d 639, 643 (1956) (citing Wilson
v. Greenville County, 110 S.C. 321,324, 96 S.E. 301, 302 (1918)).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-370 (2007).
63. See Housing Auth. ofCharleston v. Olasov, 282 S.C. 603, 608,320 S.E.2d 478,481 (Ct. App.
1984).
64. Id.
65. S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Bryant, 253 S.C. 400, 405-07, 171 S.E.2d 349, 351-52 (1969).
66. S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Westboro Weaving Co., 244 S.C. 516,519,137 S.E.2d 776, 777
(1964) (quoting City of Orangeburg v. Buford, 227 S.C. 280, 285, 87 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1955)).
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Before examining the status of the inclusion of subjective values in the
calculation of just compensation, it is appropriate to note that one need not do
much examination of this topic to obtain a clear understanding of the law. A
brief overview of federal case law regarding eminent domain quickly reveals the
status of subjective values in the federal system. The United States Supreme
Court stated that "just compensation must be measured by an objective standard
that disregards subjective values which are only of significance to an individual
owner." 67 This language demonstrates the lack of cohesion between the federal
test for just compensation and any special value that the owner places on
property.
Turning now to state policies regarding just compensation in eminent
domain, it is readily apparent that the states addressing this issue have been no
more accepting of the inclusion of subjective values than the federal system. The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that sentimental value cannot impact the
determination of fair market value.68 Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court
explicitly held that the sentimental value an individual attaches to a homestead is
not applicable in the determination of compensation. 69 The cases demonstrate
that courts confronting this issue, including the Supreme Court, have explicitly
denied consideration of the subjective values of property when calculating just
compensation.
In summary, the current methods of determining just compensation fail to
adequately consider any subjective value an owner attaches to property. In
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates,7" Judge Richard A. Posner
eloquently described the meaning of just compensation:
Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full
compensation, for market value is not the value that every
owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value
that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners
are "intramarginal," meaning that because of relocation costs,
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the
property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they
value their property at more than its market value . . . .Such
owners are hurt when the government takes their property and
gives them just its market value in return. The taking in effect
confiscates the additional (call it "personal") value that they
obtain from the property, but this limited confiscation is
permitted provided the taking is for a public use.7'
67. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35 (1984).
68. Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 176 So. 2d 282, 285 (Miss. 1965) (citation
omitted).
69. Popwell v. Shelby County, 130 So. 2d 170, 173 (Ala. 1960).
70. 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 464.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Inadequacy of the Fair Market Value Method of Calculation and
Possible Remedies
1. Steps in the Right Direction
While no court decision has expressly allowed for the inclusion of
subjective values in the calculation of just compensation, many decisions have
provided language setting the stage for a court to do just that. In North Carolina,
for example, the supreme court held that "[i]f a tract, of which the whole or a
part is taken for a public use, possesses a special value to the owner which can
be measured by money, he is entitled to have that value considered in the
estimate of compensation and damages."72 This language provides the ideal
support for the inclusion of subjective value in the calculation of just
compensation. The foreseeable problem with the utility of this language is the
inclusion of "which can be measured by money," as it will be difficult to provide
proof that any subjective value can truly be measured by money. Nonetheless,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has taken steps in the right direction.
Other courts have taken a step in the right direction by slightly departing
from the standard comparable sales analysis in determining the market value of a
piece of property.73 By allowing the appraiser to conduct a different type of
valuation in determining market value to account for the property's unique
character or special purpose, courts have opened the door to allowing the
consideration of the subjective value attached to one's home in the
determination of market value.
A 1992 decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals has a similar potential
effect. In his opinion, Judge Beasley stated that a "property owner may recover
compensation for the value of his property where the property has a unique
value to him such that fair market value does not represent just and adequate
compensation."74 Although the opinion goes on to note that pecuniary value,
rather than sentimental value, is all that the court should consider in determining
the value to the owner,75 a person wishing to include various items of subjective
value in the determination of the property's value can now make an argument
72. Brown v. W.T. Weaver Power Co., 52 S.E. 954, 958 (N.C. 1905) (quoting 15 CYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 724 (William Mack ed., 1905)).
73. See, e.g., Conti v. R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp., 900 A.2d 1221, 1237 (R.I. 2006) ("We have allowed
for the departure from this preferred method ... at the discretion of the trial justice, when the fair
market value established through comparable sales did not adequately reflect 'just compensation'
because the condemned property was 'unique or suited for a special purpose."' (quoting J.W.A. Realty,
Inc. v. City of Cranston, 399 A.2d 479, 484 (R.I. 1979))).
74. Taylor v. Jones County, 422 S.E.2d 890, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (citing CHARLES N.
PURSLEY, JR., GEORGIA EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 5-12, 6-3 (1982)).
75. Id. at 892-93.
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for such inclusions, assuming that individual is able to attach a comprehensible
monetary value to the various items.
2. Arguments for the Inclusion of Intangible Values in the Calculation
of Just Compensation
To appropriately understand the subjective value that an individual attaches
to a home, it is important to first revisit the age-old metaphor of "the home as a
man's castle." Professor Eduardo M. Pefialver has posited that there are actually
two versions of the castle metaphor, one that focuses on the "castle as
dominion," and the other that focuses on the "castle as dignity. '76 The version
portraying the castle as dominion exemplifies the "conception of the owner's
right to exclude."" Under the castle as dignity metaphor, the focus is on the
"inherent dignity of homeownership."7 This dignity results from the subjective
importance and social standing that goes hand-in-hand with owning a home.79
Pefialver argues that governmental takings intrude upon the "castle as
dominion" metaphor in two ways.8" First, when the government forces someone
to sell property, the person obviously loses the exclusive control of the property
implicit in the concept of the castle as dominion."' Second, the current method of
calculating just compensation rejects any subjective value that a homeowner
attaches to a home, thus violating the concept of the "modest home" as a castle.8"
After understanding the metaphors of the home as dignity and dominion and the
impact of eminent domain on the same, the need to include subjective property
values in the calculation of just compensation becomes evident. Subjective
values that can be monetized must be part of any compensation that is just.
While this argument by no means seeks a bright-line rule against eminent
domain in its entirety, it does insist upon the state exercising its eminent domain
power "in a manner that gives due regard to the importance of the property in
question to the lives of the people being displaced."83
Professor Christopher Serkin has discussed a similar argument, relying on
what is termed the "personality theory" of property.84 Serkin contends that
govermment should employ takings law that is "responsive to a contextual
76. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the
Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2971, 2972 (2006).
77. Id.




82. Id. at 2974.
83. ld. at 2975.
84. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory
Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677, 722-25 (2005) (discussing MARGARET JANE RADIN, Diagnosing the
Takings Problem, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE (John W. Chapman ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1991),
reprinted in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 146, 146-65 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1993)).
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inquiry into the personhood of the property taken. 85 Under this view, "[flair
market value ... is inherently inadequate to vindicate the personal connection
people may have with [deeply personal] property."86 Serkin quotes Radin's
argument that "[e]xactly what has been taken, and from whom, matters."87
Utilizing the same reasoning employed by Calabresi and Melamed in
justifying a liability rule for a large scale taking,88 it is equally convincing to
assert that courts should use a property rule for the taking of an individual's
home. When the number of parties the condemning authority must bargain with
is few, the transaction costs involved should be extremely low. Thus, a court
should use a property rule, instead of a liability rule, in determining the amount
of just compensation where the government takes a home for the purposes of
urban renewal. However, this is not to say that a court should employ a pure
property rule in this instance. A pure property rule carries with it the inherent
burdens of holdouts and excessive claims by landowners.89 To avoid these
problems, courts should utilize a hybrid rule that makes use of the characteristics
of both property rules and liability rules. Stated differently, courts should
balance the consideration of subjective elements of value with the current
method of objective valuation. The court could then make a reasonable decision
considering all of the factors affecting the property value, including subjective
values such as sentimental attachment.
Assuming minimal transaction costs, if the condemning authority values the
property more than the landowner, the condemning authority will have no
problem purchasing that entitlement for the amount the landowner believes the
entitlement is worth.9" If the condemning authority, or society, does not value
the land as much as the landowner, no transaction will take place. Thus, the use
of a property rule where a home is taken from an individual would serve two
purposes. First, the landowner would potentially receive what he believes to be
just compensation in the event that the land is taken. Second, the use of a
property rule would guarantee that the only property taken would be that which
society has a true interest in taking. Such an approach would serve as a check on
the potential arbitrary takings of property under the guise of urban renewal or
slum clearance.
85. Id. at 722.
86. Id. at 722.
87. Id. at 722 n.202 (quoting RADIN, supra note 84, at 146, 154).
88. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
89. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 53, at 1106-07.
90. Subjective values that a court would consider in a condemnation-easily monetized
values-should not add significant transaction costs.
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B. Methods by Which South Carolina Can Address Subjective Valuation
1. Judicial Methods that South Carolina Courts Could Use
In searching for methods by which South Carolina can address the inclusion
of subjective values, it is important to start with existing case law in the area of
eminent domain. While South Carolina courts have not explicitly approved the
inclusion of subjective values in the calculation of just compensation, language
exists in various opinions that can lead toward an eventual inclusion of
subjective value considerations.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has noted that "[t]he compensation to
which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the property
taken."'" While this language is by no means dispositive, it lends support to the
argument that a court could potentially consider any subjective value that the
owner places on property. Although a monetary valuation of subjective value
may be difficult to ascertain, the owner could use a property rule and declare a
personal value of the property. If the condemning authority deems the property
to be worth that value, it can purchase the property for that price.
A second place to look for support for the inclusion of subjective value in
the calculation of just compensation is South Carolina court decisions from other
areas of property law. In 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court confronted the
issue of determining whether to partition a certain piece of land in kind or by
sale.92 Although the court held that the "pecuniary interests of all of the parties is
the determining factor in deciding whether to require a judicial sale or allow a
partition by allotment[J" the court noted that "equitable considerations such as
the length of ownership and sentimental attachment to the property may be
considered."93 The supreme court's recognition of the importance of the
subjective value an individual attaches to property demonstrates a potential
willingness to extend such value considerations to the area of just compensation
for condemned property.
A second South Carolina property case containing language that supports
the inclusion of subjective value in the calculation of just compensation is Wall
v. Huguenin.94 In Wall, an action to quiet title, the supreme court determined
whether to allow the enforcement of an option to repurchase a piece of
property. 9 In holding the option enforceable, the court considered one of the
important factors to be the "highly personal attachment of the ... family to [the
property], their homeplace for two centuries." 96 If it chose to do so, a South
Carolina court could take from this language the ability to consider subjective
91. S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Faulkenberry, 337 S.C. 140, 148, 522 S.E.2d 822, 826 (Ct. App.
1999) (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923)).
92. Zimmerman v. Marsh, 365 S.C. 383, 385, 618 S.E.2d 898, 899 (2005).
93. Id. at 388, 618 S.E.2d at 901.
94. 305 S.C. 100, 406 S.E.2d 347 (1991).
95. Id. at 100, 406 S.E.2d at 348.
96. Id. at 103,406 S.E.2d at 350.
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value in making a judicial determination and allow for the consideration of such
aspects as sentimental value in calculating just compensation.
Turning to another area of law, some of South Carolina's tort decisions
certain certain language that seems to support the notion of consideration of
subjective value in calculating just compensation. In Vaught v. A. 0. Hardee &
Sons, Inc.,9 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that where a party
negligently ignited a fire that subsequently destroyed neighboring property, the
trial court could consider replacement costs of destroyed noncommercial trees
when awarding damages.98
One person's unsightly jungle may be another person's
enchanted forest; certainly the owner of such land should be
allowed to enjoy it free from a trespasser's bulldozer. Indeed, a
trespasser should not be allowed, with impunity, to negligently
or willfully wreak havoc on a landowner's natural woods, and
the landowner's attempted recovery for such injury should not
be entirely frustrated by the fact that the market does not reflect
his personal loss. 99
Vaught demonstrates the willingness of the South Carolina Supreme Court to
extend valuation of property beyond fair market value in determining how to
compensate the aggrieved party. Although Vaught is a tort case, a South
Carolina court could transfer the rule of law allowing for the consideration of
replacement costs to the field of eminent domain. Doing so would allow a court
to consider such intangible values of property as sentimental value and sheer
desire to retain one's home when calculating just compensation. A just recovery
in tort should inform the court's notion of just compensation. A landowner
suffering loss as a result of a property condemnation should not be in a worse
position than a tort victim suffering a similar loss.
In another tort case involving owner recovery for lost, damaged, or
destroyed possessions, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "[a]n owner
can recover for property destroyed or damaged by fire such damages as will
restore him to the same property status that he occupied before his property was
burned.""1 ° In Nelson v. Coleman Co., the court went on to note that when
property that has no market value is lost or destroyed, the owner may recover
"its actual or reasonable value, or its special value to him."' 1 This holding
seems applicable to the situation in which an individual's home is taken for the
purpose of slum clearance or urban renewal. If the condemning authority has
97. 366 S.C. 475, 623 S.E.2d 373 (2005).
98. Id. at 480, 623 S.E.2d at 375.
99. Id. at 482-83, 623 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 143
(Neb. 1992)).
100. Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 659, 155 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1967) (citing Hall v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 126 S.C. 330, 333, 119 S.E. 910, 911-12 (1923)).
101. Id. (citation omitted).
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deemed the area in which the property is located to be slum or blighted, the
possibility exists that the market value of the property is low. Under the current
method of determining just compensation, the owner of the property designated
as blighted could receive next to nothing in exchange for the government
condemnation. However, if a court were to apply a rule similar to that used in
Nelson, the owner of the property would be able to assert a special value to the
court for determining the appropriate amount for just compensation.
2. Statutory Methods that the South Carolina General Assembly Could
Use
Article XIV, section 5 of the South Carolina constitution vests a tremendous
level of authority in the legislature to enable municipalities to take private
property in blighted areas." 2 The legislature, however, also has the power to
pass legislation requiring courts to consider intangible values when calculating
just compensation. The current South Carolina Code of Laws requires a
condemning authority to attempt negotiation with the property owner whose
land it seeks to condemn.0 3 In an effort to more adequately compensate a
condemnee, the South Carolina General Assembly could propose legislation
similar to that recently enacted in Idaho. The Idaho legislature has set a floor for
the just compensation amount at the level of the condemning authority's last
offer prior to the property owner's instigation of litigation.0 4 While a provision
such as this will probably never reach the full amount the property owner
desires, it could provide for a potential determination of some amount higher
than fair market value or a better opportunity for just compensation.
A second example of how South Carolina could potentially require the
award of just compensation to consider aspects beyond fair market value is seen
in a bill the Missouri legislature recently enacted. 05 Under House Bill 1944, the
Missouri legislature has created two important additions to the determination of
just compensation.0 6 The first addition is a new requirement for situations the
bill refers to as "homestead takings."'0 7 Whenever the government or a
governmental entity takes an individual's primary residence, a court is to
provide the homeowner with 125% of the fair market value for just
compensation.'08
The second addition is the requirement for what the bill terms a "heritage
value."'0 9 When calculating just compensation for real property the same family
102. See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-70(B) (1991).
104. See S.B. 1429, 58th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2006), 2006 ID S.B. 1429 (NS) (Westlaw).
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has owned for fifty or more years, a court must add a heritage value equaling
50% of the-property's fair market value.11° Stated another way, if a family has
owned a piece of real property for fifty or more years, and the government or a
governmental entity takes that property, that family will receive 150% of the
property's fair market value as just compensation.
The South Carolina General Assembly could propose legislation similar to
Missouri's House Bill 1944 to more adequately compensate individuals whose
homes are taken for the purpose of slum clearance or urban renewal. While the
creation of a percentage increase such as that used in the Missouri legislation
may seem arbitrary, it is easy to apply and the courts could not invalidate it for
ambiguity. This type of legislation is most likely to succeed as it sets a clear
standard for the courts to determine just compensation but begins to account for
the underlying subjective value that an individual or family places on the home.
3. Constitutional Methods that the South Carolina General Assembly
Could Use
The final method by which South Carolina could rectify the current
inadequacies of just compensation in eminent domain is a constitutional
amendment. This method would be more difficult to employ, but the legislature
could attempt to amend the constitution to require the government to
compensate the landowner beyond the fair market value of the taken property.
The California State Legislature has proposed an amendment to their
constitution that would take a step in this direction. 1 ' Under California Senate
Constitutional Amendment 20, the California Constitution would be amended to
read that just compensation includes, but is not limited to,
the cost of acquiring comparable property; all costs and losses
incurred due to the condemnation, including, but not limited to,
loss of income, loss of business good will, and relocation costs;
and attorney's fees upon determination that the amount offered
by the public agency was less than the amount ascertained by
the jury, or the court if a jury is waived." 2
While a constitutional amendment similar to that proposed by the California
Senate does not fully account for the subjective value one attaches to property, it
at least provides additional compensation beyond fair market value.
In June 2006, the South Carolina legislature approved the submission to the
public of a proposed amendment to the eminent domain provisions in the South
110. Id.
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Carolina constitution."3 First, article I, section 13 would be amended by
including language limiting allowable condemnations to those only for public
use and by adding language to allow condemnation for the purpose of
remedying blight." 4 The amendment would define blight as "property
[constituting] a danger to the safety and health of the community by reason of
lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities, dilapidation, deleterious land
use, or any combination of these factors.""' 5 Second, the amendment would
delete the eminent domain provisions currently found in article I, section 17 and
article XIV, section 5 of the South Carolina constitution, which currently
provide the express authority to use eminent domain for slum clearance
purposes. 6
On November 7, 2006, South Carolina voters overwhelmingly supported
further protection of property rights with 86% of voters approving the proposed
constitutional amendment." 7 Prior to becoming an official amendment to the
South Carolina constitution, the legislature must ratify the amendment, which
will likely be a mere ministerial process due to the vast public approval.
While the proposed amendment to the South Carolina constitution seeks to
protect private property rights, it does not begin to scratch the surface of the
issues involving just compensation. Furthermore, the amendment, perhaps by
design, appears to destroy the government's ability to condemn land for the
purpose of slum clearance or urban renewal. While the current language of the
South Carolina constitution regarding this ability, found in article I, section 17
and article XIV, section 5, focuses on blighted areas and slums," 8 the language
of the proposed amendment seems to focus on individual structures. 1 9 By
focusing on individual structures, the condemning authority must make an
individual determination for each piece of property it wishes to condemn, even if
the purpose and result is the condemnation of an entire blighted area. A
constitutional amendment such as the one proposed in California, 2 ° or perhaps
one that incorporates provisions similar to the bill recently passed by the
Missouri legislature,' 2' would be superior to South Carolina's current proposal




116. Id.; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
117. Les Christie, Kelo 's Revenge: Voters Restrict Eminent Domain, CNNMONEY, Nov. 8, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/08/realestate/kelosrevenge/index.htm; see also Leonard Gilroy,
Eminent Domain: Voters Protect Property Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 2006, at A29, available
at http://wwv.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/16043022.htm (providing a list of states in
which voters passed amendments similar to the amendment in South Carolina).
118. See S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17; supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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since the state would be able to both maintain urban renewal and provide
fairness to homeowners.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current method of using fair market value to determine the
compensation owed to a homeowner involved in a governmental taking grossly
underestimates the true value to that homeowner. By failing to account for the
subjective value of the property to the individual, governmental entities are
failing to adequately compensate for what is commensurate to the taking of part
of the individual. As governments across the nation move forward in their
attempts to enhance private property rights, they should reconsider the method
by which they determine the value of the home. Through the use of a hybrid
property rule and liability rule analysis, courts could consider all of the
important aspects of property value in making their determination. Whether by
judicial, statutory, or constitutional design, South Carolina should revise the way
courts calculate just compensation so that perhaps one day an individual whose
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